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The most optimistic Representative Concentration Path-
way (RCP 2.6) in the fifth IPCC Assessment Report pre-
dicts a 0.3°C to 1.7°C global mean temperature change
in 2100, putting natural species and systems at risk,
possibly triggering large-scale irreversible natural dam-
age, and strongly impacting human activities (IPCC,
2014). In South America and the Caribbean, a region
representing a relevant share of global GHG emissions
with a weight of 7.7% in 2011 (World Resources Insti-
tute, 2015), slightly more than its share of the world’s
population (6.9% in 2010), the latest estimates point to
a 1.5% to 5% GDP loss by 2050 (Samaniego et al.,
2014). Particularly, Brazil already ranks fourth in the
world when it comes to national contributions to global
warming (Matthews et al., 2014) and a strong increase
in GHG emissions can be anticipated in the years to
come throughout the region on a BAU basis (Carvallo et
al., 2014; Fundación Bariloche, 2008; van Ruijven et al.,
2015). In this context, quite logically, the region has a
relevant role to play in mitigating global emissions.
No South American countries are included in Annex I of
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) and as such, before the Paris Agree-
ment on climate change signed in December 2015 in
Paris during the COP 21, they were not bound to any
GHG quantified emission reduction. They had, however,
been invited to voluntarily commit to Nationally Appro-
priate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs). Part of the Copen-
hagen Accord, NAMAs provide a flexible framework
within which non-Annex I countries can pledge voluntary
actions at an economy-wide or sectorial level, aimed at
deviating from BAU emissions (Sharma and Desgain,
2014). The nature, quantification and implementation
roadmap1 of these NAMAs vary considerably across
South America. 
Chile has pledged emission reductions of 20% by•
2020, compared to a 2009 Business-As-Usual sce-
nario (BAU); there is no quantified measure in its en-
gagement letter concerning how this target will be
met, and little description. Energy efficiency, renew-
able energies and AFOLU (Agriculture, Forestry and
Other Land-Use) are specified as the main 
action sectors for these reductions.
Brazil has based most of its pledge on quantified•
emission reductions in the field of deforestation and
more generally the AFOLU sector. These sectorial
reductions have been aggregated into an estimated
national target of 36.6% to 38.9% emission reduc-
tions below a national baseline by 2020.
Colombia has committed to 77% renewables in its•
installed electricity production capacity by 2020,
and 20% biofuels in overall fuel consumption.
Peru has pledged a 0% net deforestation rate by•
2021, as well as a minimum of 33% renewable en-
ergy in all energy consumed in the country, and non-
quantified measures for waste emissions reduction.
The country has not quantified the overall impact of
these pledges, but independent academics esti-
mate that the measures should lead to a 41% GHG
reduction compared to BAU (Hof et al., 2013).
Corresponding author: 
MINES ParisTech, PSL University, CMA-Centre for Applied Mathematics, 
Rue Claude Daunesse - CS10207, 06904 Sophia Antipolis, France
Email: sebastien.postic@mines-paristech.fr
1 For an exhaustive compilation of theses pledges, see (UNFCCC, 2013)
I - Introduction
www.modelisation-prospective.org
WWorking Paper N°2016-02-20
With the exception of small countries such as Antigua and Barbuda, the rest of the continent has so far made no
pledges to the UNFCCC. However, national communications emphasize national measures and strategies in:
Argentina: energy efficiency programs, renewable energy including biofuels and hydrogen, forest management,•
solid waste management;
Ecuador: by 2020, •
82% of oil in primary energy, down from 92% in 2011
At least 90% renewable electricity, 80% from hydropower
Uruguay: the National Plan to 2015 aims at over 15% electricity from unconventional renewable sources•
Paraguay: the country has set reforestation targets and expressed its intention to expand energy-crop cultures.•
This list is far from exhaustive for national targets and measures that are not bound to the UNFCCC. 
The energy sector, the largest contributor to GHG emission, shows promising potential to achieve climate mitigation
worldwide (Akimoto et al., 2010) and South American NAMAs consider it extensively. However, the potential of the
South American energy sector may remain below world averages (Bassi and Baer, 2009; Borba et al., 2012; Di
Sbroiavacca et al., 2015), because of an already-renewable energy mix, fast energy growth –the electrification rate
jumped from 75% in 2009 to around 90% in 2012 in Peru and Bolivia (CIER, 2013, 2011) – and the use of energy as
a tool for domestic and international policy (Colgan, 2014).
Given Latin America’s regional specificities, what contributions can its energy sector make to the fight against climate
change, and at what cost? This paper investigates this specific aspect of the energy-climate nexus in Latin America
through the prism of ongoing climate negotiations. This analysis focuses on the climate commitment of Latin America
pledged before the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) asked to publish through the 2015 United
Nations Climate Change Conference held in Paris in December and which led to the signing of a historical global
agreement on climate change. We use a bottom-up energy prospective model from the MarkAl/TIMES family with
four contrasted scenarios for future climate policies in South America, presented in section 2. In section 3, we study
the energy sector’s contribution to meeting regional climate pledges and the evolutions that such a contribution im-
plies. We start by considering the specific case of the power mix then expand our study to the whole total primary
energy supply, underlining the role of Brazil and Chile in driving the energy transition in South America. We also con-
sider the efficiency and impact of Peru and Colombia’s national commitments and the links between the AFOLU sec-
tor, the energy sector and the fight against climate change in Latin America. 
The results presented and discussed in this paper are
based on the T-ALyC model. T-ALyC, standing for TIMES
para América Latina y el Caribe, (TIMES for Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean), is a multiregional model based
on the TIMES paradigm for long-term energy prospec-
tive. This modeling approach developed under IEA’s En-
ergy Technology Systems Analysis Program (IEA-ETSAP)
Agreement considers a bottom-up representation of the
energy system and relies on linear optimization tech-
niques to meet an exogenous energy service demand at
the lowest possible discounted cost, over a given time
horizon (typically 2010-2050). The energy system is ex-
plicitly represented through a few thousand energy
processes and commodities and their individual features
(efficiency, investment costs, O&M costs, emission fac-
tors, etc.). Demand satisfaction is subject to resource
constraints (resource availability, extraction cost), tech-
nical constraints (physical balances, availability factors,
process lifetimes, etc.) and non-technical constraints
(market penetration limits, policy scenarios, environmen-
tal specifications, etc.). For more information on the
TIMES paradigm and its implementation, please refer to
(Loulou et al., 2005). TIMES models minimize the cost of
delivering a given energy service through both invest-
ment in, and operation of, energy processes. The outputs
of TIMES models are the evolution and final structure of
the energy system, individual investment and operation
costs for each modeled technology, process-related and
fuel-related emissions, energy trade flows between
model regions and with the rest of the world, and the
marginal cost of political constraints such as emission
pledges.
II - Methods and scenarios
2-1 - The T-ALyC model
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T-ALyC’s technological description is inherited from the
TIMES Integrated Assessment Model TIAM, a 15-region
representation of the whole world’s energy system, from
resource extraction to end-use energy demands (Loulou
and Labriet, 2008; Ricci and Selosse, 2013; Syri et al.,
2008). The Reference Energy System is split into a mod-
ule for fossil fuel extraction, a transformation module
from primary to refined fuels (including biomass trans-
formation), an energy conversion module for electricity
and heat production, and 5 end-use demand sectors,
as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Schematic description of T-ALyC’s RES
T-ALyC considers the entire Latin America and the
Caribbean region, excluding Mexico (conforming with
the current Central and South America region in TIAM).
T-ALyC relies on an ad hoc disaggregation of the area
into 10 sub-regions (cf. Table 1) to address region-spe-
cific issues including the role of hydropower and inter-
rogations about its future development, the current and
future role of biofuels in the energy mix, challenges, op-
portunities and time dynamics of regional integration
and the climate change-energy nexus. T-ALyC thus em-
phasizes in its geographical structure the main geo-en-
ergy trends of the continent, which include among
others the weight and diversity of Brazil, the strategic
interconnecting role of Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay and
Central America, and the diverging paths of Chile and
Argentina. The base year for model projections is 2010
and the end horizon is 2050. This time span is divided
into 6 time periods, then 6 representative time slices in
each period (three seasons: Winter, Summer, Intermedi-
ate; two diurnal divisions: Day, Night).
Region name Region description
AND Peru, Ecuador
ARG Argentina
BPU Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay
BSE Brazil – South and Southeast administrative regions
BWC Brazil – North, Northeast and Center administrative regions
CHL Chile
COL Colombia
CYC Central America and the Caribbean
SUG Suriname, Guyana, French Guyana
VEN Venezuela
Table 1: T-ALyC geographical disaggregation
Energy potentials and end-use
demands are calibrated based
on a wide variety of sources,
including (ALACER, 2013; Gar-
cés et al., 2012; Global Energy
Observatory, 2013; Hoornweg
and Bhada-Tata, 2012; IEA,
2014; IER, 2006; IMF, 2014;
Riegelhaupt and Chalico,
2009; Smeets et al., 2007; UN-
DESA, 2012; UNEP, 2012; US-
EIA, 2014; World Nuclear
Association, 2008) and na-
tional sources. For this study,
prices for energy commodity
trade with the rest of the world
are based on TIAM endoge-
nous trade prices for the Cen-
tral and South America region.
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2-2 - GHG emissions and storage in T-ALyC
The emission structure in South America is quite
different from the rest of the world. Brazil’s national
emission inventory reports GHG emissions from
the energy sector that amount to only 15% of total
national emissions (Brazilian Ministry of Science
and Technology, 2010). By comparison, energy
emissions for the European Union at the same date
accounted for 80% of total emissions2 (European
Commission, 2014). This is mainly due to AFOLU:
while in 2005 the Land-use, Land Use Change and
Forestry sector in Europe was a net sink at 281 Mt
CO2eq, the same sector in Brazil contributed up to
1,329 Mt CO2eq to national emissions. AFOLU
emissions are thus not explicitly energy-related, yet
they can impact the energy system through climate
pledges. Faced with an emission-reduction objec-
tive, planners could choose to spend the money
either on emission reductions in the energy-pro-
duction sector, or on dedicated non-energy meas-
ures in e.g. the AFOLU or waste sectors. In the
case of waste-linked emissions, emission reduc-
tions can even lead to energy production if landfill
gases are retrieved and used for electricity gener-
ation. Available options in AFOLU include curbing
deforestation, reforestation measures (re-establish-
ment of a forest depleted by deforestation) and af-
forestation (creation of new forest areas). See
(Smith et al., 2014) for a complete description of
AFOLU’s stakes in relation to global warming.
Such emissions are taken into account in our
model through dedicated emission technologies,
with an exogenous calibration based on national
communications to the UNFCCC. Figure 2 below
summarizes these contributions.
2 Excluding AFOLU which is actually a sink rather than a source of CO2 emissions in Europe
Figure 2: Accounting for non-energy GHG sources and sinks in T-ALyC
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While some emission reduction potentials are directly
linked to the amount of emissions (e.g. thermal de-
struction of N2O emissions from the Nitric Acid In-
dustry, or the fight against deforestation), some
potentials are only partially related to such emissions
– e.g. reforestation – or totally unrelated – e.g. stor-
age in deep aquifers. In the case of forestry-based
options, the potentials and associated costs were
calibrated on external sources such as (Asner et al.,
2014; Brazilian Ministry of Science and Technology,
2010; Elberg Nielsen et al., 2014; Gonzalez Arenas et
al., 2011; Ministerio de Ambiente de Colombia, 2012;
Ministerio de Ambiente del Perú, 2010; Ministerio del
Ambiente del Ecuador, 2012, 2011; Ministerio del
Medio Ambiente de Chile, 2011; Ministerio del Medio
Ambiente de Uruguay, 2010; Nepstad et al., 2009;
Secretaria de Ambiente de la República Argentina,
2007; Secretaria de Ambiente del Paraguay, 2011;
Smith et al., 2014; Viceministerio del Medio Ambiente
de Bolivia, 2009). We separate measures related to
the fight against deforestation, calibrated on national
baseline projections for deforestation, from afforesta-
tion-related measures, whose potential is linked to
the available surface area. This area depends on the
amount of forest-free land, and on the competition
between afforestation and agriculture or other pro-
ductive activities.
For all other options, we used TIAM costs and po-
tentials (Ricci and Selosse, 2013) and regionalized
the latter based on the T-ALyC regions’ extraction
potentials and surface areas. The potentials and
costs of carbon storage technologies are detailed in
Table 2 and Table 3 respectively. CCS option costs
include transportation.
STORAGE OPTION AND ARG BPU BSE BWC CHL COL CYC SUG VEN
Enhanced Oil Recovery 1,629 2,863 1,732 1,593 7,258 778 1,087 762 369 928
Storage in depleted fields 5,341 9,389 5,680 5,224 23,798 2,552 3,564 2,498 1,211 3,044
Enhanced coalbed meth. recov. 171 301 182 168 764 82 114 80 39 98
Deep saline aquifers 2,598 4,566 2,763 2,541 11,574 1,241 1,733 1,215 589 1,480
Curbing deforestation 15,506 1 4,905 1,272 12,053 0 3,764 0 0 0
Afforestation/reforestation 3,299 1,561 756 572 5,424 229 1,258 0 0
Table 2: Cumulative storage capacity (2010-2050) for T-ALyC carbon storage options (MtCO2)
STORAGE OPTION COST ($/TCO2)
Deep saline aquifers (onshore) 5.7
Deep saline aquifers (offshore) 9.3
Enhanced Oil Recovery and depleted fields injection (onshore) 5.1
Enhanced Oil Recovery and depleted fields injection (offshore) 8.2
Enhanced coalbed methane recovery 4.9
Curbing deforestation – Step 1 3
Curbing deforestation – Step 2 6
Curbing deforestation – Step 3 55
Afforestation – Step 1 10
Afforestation – Step 2 25
Afforestation – Step 3 45
Table 3: Cost of carbon storage technologies ($2000/tCO2)
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2-2 - Climate scenarios
We investigate the impact of climate negotiations on the South American energy sector through 4 scenarios,
namely “Business-As-Usual” (BAU), “Brazil and Chile only” (BraChi), “All Nationally Adapted Mitigation Ac-
tions” (NAMAs) and “Quantified reductions for all” (Red4All).
The Business-As-Usual scenario considers that no climate pledge is taken by any country. It allows us to
present the key energy determinants of the continent, and serves as a comparison point for our climate
pledge scenarios. We also use it to set the targets for climate scenarios, when such targets are defined as
a reduction below a national emission baseline.
Brazil and Chile only is the least stringent climate scenario, considering only quantified reduction pledges
for Brazil and Chile. For Brazil, our target is less stringent than that pledged in 2010, since the original ob-
jective was based on national BAU projections. We did not have access to this BAU, but the fight against
deforestation improved dramatically between 2005 and 2010, so we can assume that part of the objective
has already been met (emissions in 2010 and after in our own BAU are calibrated based on updated national
inventories and are already much lower than in 2005). Also, Brazil’s constraint is written as an overall cap
for the joint emissions of the two-region Brazil, meaning that the choice of where to reduce emissions is
left to the model. Both Brazil and Chile’s targets are extrapolated to a 40% reduction below BAU in 2050. 
All Nationally Adapted Mitigation Actions considers that UNFCCC pledges as described in the Introduction
are implemented in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru, plus a 30% deforestation reduction in Ecuador. Unlike
for Brazil and Chile, the pledges for Colombia, Peru and Ecuador do not become stronger between 2020
and 2050. National voluntary policies that have not led to an NAMA pledge to the UNFCCC were not in-
cluded in our modeling hypotheses.
Last, in Quantified Reductions for all, we consider that all countries make Chilean-like pledges on their
future emissions. The only exceptions are Venezuela, Suriname, and Guyana. We consider that Venezuela
would not adhere to any international agreements on climate3 and the data we have on Suriname and
Guyana is too poor to make any valuable projection concerning climate commitments. These assumptions
are summarized in Table 4.
Region 2020 targets 2050 targets
BAU             BraChi           NAMAs         Red4All BAU             BraChi           NAMas         Red4All
AND
ARG
BPU
BSE
BWC
CHL
COL
CYC
SUG
VEN
- -
NAMAs -20%
- -
- -20%
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -20%
- -
- -20%
-
-25% -25% -25%
-
-25% -25% -25%
-
-20% -20% -20%
-
-40% -40% -40%
-
-40% -40% -40%
-
-40% -40% -40%
-
- NAMAs -20%
-
- NAMAs -40%
- -
- -40%
- -
- -40%
- -
NAMAs -40%
- -
- -40%
Table 4: Scenario assumptions for regional emission targets
3  Venezuela’s current strong opposition to the US, as well as the fact that the country uses oil as a power tool for its domestic and international politics, make
future commitments uncertain; in addition, Venezuela has not, to date, revised its First National Communication to the UNFCCC, submitted in 2005
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Figure 3 shows the regional impact of climate scenarios in terms of emission reductions.
Pledges by Brazil and Chile alone achieve a reduction of 1.08 GtCO2eq, equal to 17.5%
below BAU projection, which is nearly half of the reductions achieved in the most stringent
scenario. The NAMAs scenario results in an emissions reduction of 23.6% below BAU in
2050 (4.8 GtCO2eq instead of 6.2), yet 2050 emissions are still above 2010 figures, and the
upward trend is not curbed. In the case of national commitments to reduce emissions by at
least 40% from all countries (minus Venezuela), a 35.3% emission reduction below BAU is
achieved in the region. 2050 GHG emissions are below 2010 levels, yet they climb up again
from 2020 onwards, mainly due to Venezuelan emissions.
III - Results and discussion: Impact of climate pledges on the Energy sector
Figure 3: GHG emissions in CSA under BAU, NAMAs and Red4All scenarios
In the following paragraphs we detail this first insight, by comparing our Business-As-Usual
projections with climate scenarios at sub-region and sector level. We first consider the power
mix, then total primary energy production.
3-1 Impact of climate pledges on electricity 
In 2012, South America already boasted a highly renewable electricity mix, with more than 60%
of hydro-sourced electricity (CIER, 2013). The remaining electricity production was mainly made
up of fossil fuels (gas, oil and coal) and nuclear power, leaving some room for improvement. Elec-
tricity generation is bound to almost double between 2010 and 2050, reflecting the region’s fore-
casted strong growth, and this could, in principle, increase the share of carbon-emitting electricity
sources in the energy mix, under BAU conditions. Figure 4, however, shows a completely different
outcome in our projections. Despite a 92% increase in electricity generation, the share of fossil
fuels drops sharply between 2012 and 2040. Similarly, while hydro production keeps increasing
in absolute terms – from 677 TWh in 2010 to 1554 TWh in 2050, its share stabilizes in 2030, then
starts dropping in the last two decades. The production gap is filled mainly by wind- and solar-
based electricity production.
www.modelisation-prospective.org
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Figure 4: Electricity production in South America, 2012-2050 (Business-As-Usual)
The implications of such a result are already highly interest-
ing: with no other assumption apart from cost minimization
on a long-term horizon, the model already chooses green
energies as the most interesting options for electricity pro-
duction. This is partly due to the fact that this scenario oc-
curs in an ideal world where long-term centralized planning
is the rule. In practice, authors such as (Arango and Larsen,
2010) have stressed the fact that market forces and national
policies in e.g. Argentina may lead to a carbonization of the
electricity matrix in the years to come. However, our results
imply that moving from a nearly 100% renewable power mix
today to a 100% renewable mix tomorrow in South America
is more about social acceptation and economic limitation
than its lack of technical or economic potential.
Figure 5 displays the variations in power generation for our
three climate scenarios compared to BAU, from the least
stringent (BraChi) to the most stringent (Red4All). The impact
of climate pledges on the energy sector appears clearly: the
reliance on fossil fuels decreases in the three climate sce-
narios, and more so as time goes by. The amount of elec-
tricity generated under emission constraints is also slightly
higher than in our BAU case, and so are electricity prices.
Fossil fuels are replaced by hydropower, geothermal elec-
tricity and biomass-based production. The lower reliance on
solar electricity in 2050 is mostly due to Brazil and Argentina
and Colombia, and occurs for two main reasons. First, once
oil has been completely removed from the electricity mix, the
model installs BECCS technologies instead of solar panels
to further decarbonize its electricity. Second, electricity
prices rise slightly under climate constraint, and we reach a
tipping point between decentralized PV and centralized, mid-
price hydro production. This is a manifestation of the ‘razor
edge effect’ of linear optimization models, as documented
by e.g. (Labriet et al., 2010). 
Figure 5: Modification of the power mix relative to BAU in BraChi, NAMAs and Red4All scenarios
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We can detail this ‘razor edge’ effect for Colombia, in the NAMAs scenario. As a reminder, sectorial NAMAs were only
proposed by Peru/Ecuador and Colombia (T-ALyC’s AND and COL regions). They lead to an additional emissions re-
duction of 380 Mt CO2eq in 2050 on the continent compared to BraChi, which is a further 6.2% below BAU. Figure 6
presents the evolution of the power mix, from BraChi to NAMAs, in three cost scenarios:
The first one (NAMAs in the key on the figure) is the BAU cost scenario.•
In NAMAs_1%, both the investment and O&M costs for mid-price dam technology increase by 1%, to 1.290 $/W•
and 2.42 cts/W/yr, respectively. 
In NAMAs_2%, both the investment and O&M costs for mid-price dam technology increase by 2%, to 1.300 $/W•
and 2.44 cts/W/yr, respectively.
While this cost evolution does not impact the power mix in the AND region, the effect is quite disproportionate for COL:
in the regular NAMAs scenario, most decentralized PV generation is displaced by hydropower, but this effect disappears
completely with 2% higher dam costs. The cost structure is different for decentralized PV and centralized hydro pro-
duction: in the decentralized PV case, investment costs are high and daily availability is constrained, but we consider
no operation and maintenance costs, no transmission costs and/or losses. Investment costs are lower for hydropower,
yet this technology is burdened by fixed operation and maintenance costs, transmission costs and transmission losses.
However, the present value of the electricity generated by these two technologies in 2050 differs very little. Climate con-
straints increase the volumes and marginal costs of electricity production and favor the latter, as a consequence of the
aforementioned ‘razor edge’ effect. In AND, NAMAs induce an increase in wind, solar and hydro energy in the electricity
mix, while biomass is redirected towards heat production.
Figure 6: Deviation from the BraChi power mix in COL and AND in the NAMAs scenario, for three price scenarios
South America’s electricity mix thus contributes to regional emission targets by two means: 
First, by lowering the carbon intensity of the electricity produced: the reliance on fossil fuels is reduced by 75% in•
2050 under the most stringent climate scenario, compared to BAU projection. Together with the introduction of
BECCS technologies, 17% of the continent’s total electricity generation in 2050 shifts towards greener technologies,
from a situation in which the electricity matrix was already quite virtuous.
Second, by increasing the absolute amount of electricity produced, by up to 5% in 2050. Clean electricity competes•
here with other forms of energy for providing end-use energy services, mainly in the industry sector.
However, the added impact of the NAMAs scenario on the electricity mix is rather limited. This is mainly due to two
factors: first, the only regions where NAMAs apply, namely AND and COL, together represent 11% of the electricity gen-
erated in South America in 2010 (15% in 2050). Second, unlike Chile and Brazil’s pledges, which are based on BAU pro-
jections, the electricity targets registered as NAMAs for COL and AND are already partially met under BAU conditions.
www.modelisation-prospective.org
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3-2 - Impact of climate pledges on primary energy consumption
3-2-1- The relevance of oil exports
When taking export-bound oil production into ac-
count, fossil fuels dominate primary energy produc-
tion, constantly accounting for more than 70% of
total production (Figure 7). In 2030, fossil fuels rep-
resent 80% of Latin American primary production; oil
alone makes up 60% of this production, at
1,186 Mtoe. 
The decrease in oil production after 2030 is owed to
two factors (see Figure 8). First, Venezuelan crude oil
exports, which make up the bulk of South American
exports, are capped in our model at 24 PJ/year (ap-
prox. 573 Mtoe/yr) to avoid over-unrealistic export
volumes, since global oil prices are static in this ver-
sion of T-ALyC. Due to capacity expansion inertia,
this threshold is reached in 2030, marking a clear
break in the upward trend. Second, after two
decades of oil bounty, exporting towards its neigh-
bors and the rest of the world, Brazil itself starts im-
porting oil, dragging Argentina and Uruguay along.
The conjunction of those factors starts a downward
trend for oil production in 2030. In the 2030-2050 pe-
riod however, the rise of biomass and solar energy in
the primary mix offsets this trend, leading to nearly
stationary primary energy consumption between
2030 and 2050. However, primary solar energy as
considered here is the incoming solar radiation be-
fore conversion into electricity4. As a consequence,
the contribution of both biomass and solar energy to
primary energy consumption is significantly larger
than their actual output in terms of
electricity/fuel/heat production.
4 That is, without the energy losses incurred by solar panels/connecting lines. About 85% of this primary energy
is lost in the conversion process.
Figure 7: Primary energy production under BAU assumptions
Figure 8: Latin America’s fossil fuel trade with the rest of world (BAU)
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The overwhelming majority of exported oil is crude,
with few associated emissions. Nevertheless, climate
pledges could still impact oil trade in South America,
in three main ways:
Regardless of decisions and pledges from other world
regions, penalizing the regional consumption of fossil
fuels (through taxes, subsidies on green fuels, etc.)
would indeed make them less competitive on the in-
ternal market, but would not impact exports’ compet-
itiveness. We can thus expect that the decrease in
primary fossil energy production will at best be limited,
with a shift from internal consumption to exports. Fi-
nancing a green subsidy policy could even lead to an
increase in oil production when the takeoff of renew-
ables is bound to the redistribution of an oil rent, as
studied by (Goldemberg et al., 2014).
Export volumes can be voluntarily reduced as part of
a political volition to reduce the continent’s contribu-
tion to global emissions. The Yasuni-ITT initiative, al-
though unsuccessful, established an interesting case
for this type of new cooperation framework (Pellegrini
et al., 2014; Vallejo et al., 2015).
Export volumes can also drop as a result of interna-
tional climate pledges, through their impact on global
oil prices. The idea here is that international pledges
would push renewable energy production and reduce
global oil demand, thus bringing down oil prices.
Venezuela produces heavy oil at relatively high costs
(breakeven price estimated at USD 30, compared to
USD 10 for Saudi Arabian wells) and would be among
the first impacted by such a slowdown (its budget
breakeven is considered by most analyses to be
around or above USD 120). This assumption is con-
firmed by studies such as e.g. (Labriet et al., 2015).
Another route could be a global border tax system,
which would place oil exports on a level field with in-
ternal oil consumption (see e.g. (Keen and Kotsogian-
nis, 2014)) but have a detrimental effect on national
industries. 
The risk inherent to such a scenario would be that the
no-longer-exported oil could be consumed within
Latin America itself, replacing other renewable forms
of energy production, starting with biofuels. As a first
approximation of this issue, Figure 9 presents the evo-
lution of the primary energy mix (net of trade) in a
global context with oil prices 40% lower than their
BAU value: solar energy all but disappears from the
energy mix, and some gas is also replaced.
Figure 9: Change in primary energy consumption in CSA with low global oil prices
Brazilian pledges drive regional decarbonization
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3-2-2- Brazilian pledges drive regional decarbonization
Figure 10 shows primary energy production in Latin America minus net energy trade. The total primary energy supply
is multiplied by slightly more than 2.5 between 2010 and 2050. The share of oil is considerably reduced (from 60%
down to 35% in 2030) and, conversely, the share of gas increases, mainly due to net gas imports from Brazil and
Chile. The overall fossil fuel share remains below 70% of total primary consumption during the whole period, yet
the mix is quite heavily fossil-fuel based. While the power sector is the first fossil fuel consumer in 2010, the demand
for fossil fuels is increasingly driven by industry and transport (Figure 11), as electricity depends less and less on
fossil fuels5.
Beyond relatively virtuous power production, BAU projections for energy production in Latin America thus leave
some room for GHG emission reductions, most of all in the transport and industry sectors. This decarbonization
potential could be tapped through biofuel policies, energy efficiency measures, investment in clean generation and
transportation, modal shift, etc. We consider here the impact of pledge reductions as is, that is, without choosing a
particular sector to achieve emission reductions ex ante, and without implementing any other ad hoc scheme than
those described in Introduction.
Figure 11: fossil fuel consumption in 2010 and 2050 (BAU)
Figure 10: Primary energy consumption in BAU case – net of trade
5 The elctric mobility option, although much discussed in literature, is actually not studied here, due to model limita-
tions. It could bring interesting further research venues, though. 
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Figure 12 displays the variations in pri-
mary energy supply (net of trade) for the
three climate scenarios compared to
BAU, from the least stringent (BraChi) to
the most stringent (Red4All). As for elec-
tricity, the decline in fossil fuels is note-
worthy; a new element, however, is the
higher penetration of natural gas in pri-
mary energy. Under climate constraints,
the industry sector shifts from coal to
gas for steam and process heat genera-
tion, most of all in the two Brazil regions
(BSE and BWC). BSE’s industrial sector
still exhibits a strong reliance on biomass
(bagasse) in the three scenarios.
Transport shifts heavily from oil-based
fuels to biodiesel, with more than 40
Mtoe/yr new bio-based fuels in 2050 in
the Red4All scenario. Both gasoline and
diesel are impacted by this trend. All in
all, a little more than 15% of the conti-
nent’s 2050 primary energy production is
transferred towards greener energy
sources in the most stringent climate
scenario, Red4All.
We now compare the BraChi scenario,
where only Brazil and Chile’s pledges are
considered, with our BAU scenario. Fig-
ure 13 shows the impact of Brazil and
Chile’s pledges on energy trade in South
America. BraChi pledges result not only
in a decrease in national fossil fuel pro-
duction and an increase in renewable-
based energy production for the
countries concerned; they also impact
the rest of the continent through trade.
BPU oil exports to Brazil and AND ex-
ports to Chile drop due to oil’s reduced
competitiveness in these two countries.
Bolivia increases its gas exports to Brazil
until 2040; however, this increase ex-
hausts Bolivian low-cost gas reserves,
leading Brazil to shift to global markets
to import its oil in the last period (2050).
Finally, and most importantly, Colombia
slows down its coal exports to Brazil
(and, to a lesser extent, Chile), preferring
to export its coal out of South America.
This impact is far from negligible, as the
coal redirected towards global markets
in 2040 and 2050 represents more than
70% of total Colombian coal exports to
Brazil – which, in turn, represent nearly
all of Brazil’s coal consumption in 2050.
Figure 12: Modification of the primary energy mix relative to
BAU in BraChi, NAMAs and Red4All scenarios
Figure 13: Impact of Brazil and Chile’s pledges on intra-continental trade
A commitment by Brazil and Chile alone
thus impacts the whole continent.
Brazilian pledges to reduce emissions
below BAU make fossil fuels less com-
petitive in the country, and Brazil’s eco-
nomic weight6 also drives their reduced
competitiveness in neighboring coun-
tries, which translates into lower fossil
fuel consumption inside South America
itself and more exports outside the sub-
continent.
6 As a reminder, Brazil alone represents more than 40% of the continent’s GDP, making it a giant in the region.
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3-2-3- Sectorial targets: limited impact on energy
Let us now move to the NAMAs scenario. As already stated in paragraph 3.1, sectorial NAMAs have only
been proposed by Peru/Ecuador and Colombia (T-ALyC’s AND and COL regions). They lead to an additional
emissions reduction of 380 Mt CO2eq in 2050 on the continent compared to BraChi, which is an additional
6.2% below BAU. However, this emissions reduction burden is not shared equally: for AND, emission reduc-
tions in 2050 under NAMAs assumptions represent 35.1% of all BAU emissions, while they account for 3.2%
of BAU emissions in COL. There are two explanations for this difference:
First, Colombia’s primary energy consumption is much less impacted by national NAMAs than Peru’s (Figure
14). In the Andean region, bio-based energy production increases by up to 26.9 Mtoe/yr in 2050 compared
to the BraChi scenario, that is, the increase represents 23% of AND total primary energy production in 2050
in BraChi7. On the other hand, primary energy production is only slightly impacted in 2050 in Colombia: the
lower reliance on fossil fuels in 2050 (-3.03 Mtoe/yr) represents only a 2.8% deviation from Colombia’s primary
energy mix in BraChi. The main reason is that Colombia’s NAMAs are already satisfied in our BAU projections,
and more so in the BraChi scenario. This highlights one drawback of NAMAs compared to pledges for global
reductions below a Business-as-Usual projection: while the latter always forces a change in the trend, the
former may only follow the trend, with little if any impact.
Second, Peru and Ecuador’s NAMAs include a strong commitment to reduce deforestation, while Colombia’s
national objectives in this area are not formalized as UNFCCC pledges. Beyond real but limited improvements
through the energy mix, deforestation pledges account for 332 MtCO2eq avoided emissions in the AND re-
gion; in other words, 90% of AND’s emission reductions result from the fight against deforestation. This high-
lights a second drawback of NAMAs: even NAMAs that effectively move the energy mix away from its BAU
track may fail to deliver relevant GHG emission reductions in the specific South American context. On the
positive side, though, well-designed NAMAs (here with deforestation-based targets) may deliver substantial
emission reductions, without impacting strategic sectors such as energy production. 
From the AND experience, we can infer that the energy sector may not have the highest emissions reduc-
tion potential in South America, due to the weight of forestry and agriculture in the continent’s emissions.
This assumption is detailed and confirmed in the next paragraph.
7 We consider NAMAs’ impact by comparison with BraChi and not BAU to remove Brazil’s influence on e.g. Colombia’s coal exports.
Figure 14: Primary consumption variation in AND and COL, from BraChi to NAMAs
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In this last paragraph, we review the
various sources and sinks for
greenhouse gases modeled in T-
ALyC and their contribution to GHG
emission reduction, to contextual-
ize the energy sector’s contribution
to fulfilling regional climate commit-
ments. 
Figure 15 shows GHG emissions,
sector by sector, under the least
stringent (BAU) and most stringent
(Red4All) pledge scenarios, for the
whole region. Figure 16 details
GHG abatement in the Red4All sce-
nario. Agriculture is the most emit-
ting sector, totaling 47% of regional
emissions in 2050 in the BAU sce-
nario (2.9 GtCO2eq out of 6.17
GtCO2eq total emissions). The in-
dustry and transport sectors ac-
count for 37% of GHG emissions,
while the energy sector (oil refining
and electricity production) comes
third with 12% of total emissions.
The cumulative emission reduc-
tions achieved by energy, industry,
transport, residential and commer-
cial sectors together, through
modal shift, renewable energy, car-
bon capture and storage, industrial
efficiency, etc. represent 44% of
total GHG abatement in 2050 under
the Red4All scenario. Meanwhile,
the remaining 56% are provided by
AFOLU measures (mainly fighting
deforestation, and reforestation). It
is worth noting that due to the vir-
tuous trend highlighted in para-
graph 3.1, energy emissions
already decrease in Business-as-
Usual conditions, and that energy is
the only sector showing this down-
ward trend.
Figure 16 allows us to focus specif-
ically on emissions absorption. The
gray shading concerns absorption
in the energy sector, green shows
forestry options and red indicates
GHG abatement options deployed
in end-use sectors. The GHG
abatement displayed here only re-
lates to specific abatement-tar-
geted measures as described in the
legend, i.e. it does not consider
emission reductions through e.g.
fuel shift, demand reduction or effi-
ciency improvements. As a conse-
quence, the origin of emissions
reduction in the transport and in-
dustry sectors is not captured well.
The role of carbon storage in reduc-
ing energy emissions, however, ap-
pears clearly: together, enhanced
Oil & Gas Recovery and Storage in
depleted fields account for 200
MtCO2eq of emission reductions,
i.e. more than 40% of all energy-
bound emission reductions. Proper
handling of flared gases adds an-
other 36.5 MtCO2eq, with the re-
maining reductions due to further
decarbonization of the energy mix.
What also clearly emerges is the
key role played by forestry in GHG
emissions abatement, with 1,218
MtCO2eq emissions avoided by
combating deforestation and pro-
moting reforestation.
3-3 - Non-energy emissions 
8As a reminder, “Agriculture” in T-ALyC aggregates all AFOLU emissions.
Figure 15: GHG net emissions by sector, under BAU and Red4All scenarios
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Figure 16: GHG capture and storage by sector (Red4All scenario)
The emissions reduction patterns considered here are radically different from the situation in Europe, where
energy is foreseen as the main contributor to emissions reduction by 2050 (European Commission, 2011).
In Central and South America, due to the overwhelming weight of AFOLU emissions, decarbonizing energy
production and consumption is no longer the least expensive or most efficient tool to reduce GHG emissions.
In fact, it would fall short of delivering more than 50% emission reduction, even at a prohibitive cost, and
the target set here for 2050 –a 40% reduction– is not that far from that limit.  GHG emission reductions in
South America should therefore be considered from a very different viewpoint: energy is not the easiest way
to achieve emissions reduction because it is not the main problem; forestry, on the other hand, remains a
long-run carbon sink whose management options are the focus of active research, in terms of both technol-
ogy and policy aspects (Arima et al., 2014; Asner et al., 2014). In the whole world, it is estimated that defor-
estation and forest degradation account for 17% of GHG emissions (IPCC, 2007) and these activities are
already seen as a ‘low-hanging fruit’ in the fight against climate change (Stern, 2007), (Buizer et al., 2014).
The present work tends to confirm this trend in the case of South America.
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IV - Conclusions and policy implications
This paper analyzed the energy sector’s contribution to
GHG emissions reduction in the UNFCCC framework. We
outlined South America’s energy sector potential for GHG
abatement and the evolutions required to realize this 
potential. 
We investigated this issue by means of a bottom-up, long-
term optimization model, based on the TIMES paradigm
yet specifically designed for South America: the TIMES-
América Latina y el Caribe model, or T-ALyC. We com-
pared four scenarios based on current national
communications to the UNFCCC: a Business-As-Usual
case, a BraChi scenario where only Brazil and Chile’s
pledges apply, a NAMAs scenario including all communi-
cated NAMAs, and a hypothetic Red4All scenario where
all countries except Venezuela would make Brazil-like
commitments to reduce their GHG emissions by 40%
below their baseline by 2050.
In our projections, energy accounts for nearly 20% of
emission reductions in the most stringent (Red4All) sce-
nario, with AFOLU providing 56% of these reductions in
2050. We find that energy is not the main contributor to
emission reductions in South America for two main rea-
sons: first, in our baseline, long-term economic optimiza-
tion already leads to a decarbonization of the electricity
sector. Further decarbonization can be achieved by shift-
ing primary energy consumption by end-use sectors such
as industry or transport. Second, the weight of deforesta-
tion and land degradation in the continent’s GHG balance
is considerable, even today, and it is more economically
viable to curb this trend than to decarbonize a fairly clean
energy mix. As a consequence, the impact of national
pledges on the energy sector is real, yet feedback in terms
of GHG abatement remains limited. We find that while
pledges by Brazil and Chile impact the whole continent’s
energy trade by undermining oil and coal competitiveness,
the added impact of Colombia’s NAMAs is low, since na-
tional targets do not go far beyond our BAU trend. In Peru
and Ecuador, NAMAs’ impact on the energy system is
more significant, yet forestry-aimed NAMAs alone deliver
90% of the sub-region’s GHG abatement. However, the
overall impact of NAMAs on Peru and Ecuador is strong,
leading to significant emission reductions compared to
BAU (35%). We also showed that a sustained drop in in-
ternational oil prices due to e.g. an international climate
agreement, could negatively impact the continent’s emis-
sions if South America did not commit to such an agree-
ment, as oil exports would be redirected towards internal
consumption and displace renewable energy sources. It is
worth noting that such a drop would also have dramatic
consequences on the Venezuelan economy, which relies
quite heavily on oil exports. 
The policy implications of these results, as developed in
the results section, are many. We summarize four of them
here. First, our results confirm the initial statement that
South American climate-energy issues merit ad hoc mod-
eling at a regional scale, since the countries on the conti-
nent share features that are quite different from the rest of
the world, i.e. a highly renewable energy mix, very high re-
newable energy potentials along with high deforestation
and degradation rates, which call for regional answers to
regional issues. Second, in light of our results, that is, con-
sidering a first-order optimum that leaves aside energy
markets and short-term decision-making, clean energy
generation appears to be an economically viable option for
South America. It is beyond the range of our modeling ap-
proach to take non-optimality factors into account to de-
termine a second-best optimum; however, these first
results suggest that heavy subsidies on fossil fuels such
as those that exist in Venezuela, Argentina and Peru, may
not move in the direction of economic optimality, in addi-
tion to their environmental inefficiency. Third, the signifi-
cance of Brazil in South America’s fight against climate
change is incontestable, since its decisions already drive
relevant changes in its neighbors’ energy mixes. Last, and
most important, we confirm that, in contrast to Annex I
countries, energy cannot be the main focus of efforts to
fight global warming in South America because it is not the
continent’s main problem. In South America, deforestation
and land degradation are not only part of the climate issue:
they make up the bulk of it.
The importance of deforestation also points to one limita-
tion of our study: although we considered energy produc-
tion and transformation in a very detailed way, our
representation is more limited when it comes to AFOLU,
due to the weak link between energy and e.g. reforesta-
tion. Further investigation of energy and AFOLU interac-
tions in a climate context would require internalizing a
bottom-up approach of the forestry sector, building on
work such as e.g. (Overmars et al., 2014). Following an-
other research line, integrating our results back into the
global TIAM energy model would extend the intuitions we
developed here on the role of oil in an interesting way, pro-
viding dynamic oil price feedback based on the possible
results of climate talks, rather than a mere sensitivity analy-
sis. Last, one major component of the climate-energy
nexus that has not been touched on here is the adaptation
issue: beyond mitigation, how to prepare a strongly renew-
able, climate-sensitive energy mix to tackle uncertain cli-
mate change effects? This issue is currently being worked
on, and will form the basis of another publication.
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